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Abstract
It is not known whether prolonged exposure to perceived and imagined complex visual images produces similar shifts in
subsequent perception through selective adaptation. This question is important because a positive finding would suggest
that perception and imagery of visual stimuli are mediated by shared neural networks. In this study, we used a selective
adaptation procedure designed to induce high-level face-identity aftereffects—a phenomenon in which extended exposure
to a particular face facilitates recognition of subsequent faces with opposite features while impairing recognition of all other
faces. We report here that adaptation to either real or imagined faces produces a similar shift in perception and that identity
boundaries represented in real and imagined faces are equivalent. Together, our results show that identity information
contained in imagined and real faces produce similar behavioral outcomes. Our findings of high-level visual aftereffects
induced by imagined stimuli can be taken as evidence for the involvement of shared neural networks that mediate
perception and imagery of complex visual stimuli.
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Introduction
An encounter with a familiar person’s name often generates the
image of that person in our mind. The process by which an image
is created without actual retinal input is referred to as visual
imagery. Although there are reports of patients with deficits of
perception but intact imagery [1,2], multiple lines of evidence
from behavioral [3,4] and neuroimaging [5–7] studies suggest that
the properties and neural substrates of imagery are similar to those
of perception. The similarities in neural structures underlying
imagery and perception are further corroborated by an electro-
physiological study showing that single neurons in the human
medial temporal lobe respond to both imagery and perception [8].
It is possible also to use psychophysical methods to study the
neural mechanisms underlying perception and imagery. One
approach is to use selective adaptation to directly probe the
biological basis of cognitive function. In a selective adaptation
experiment, an adapting stimulus is presented for an extended
period of time, resulting in a temporary perceptual distortion, or
aftereffect [9]. Aftereffects have been found with a wide range of
visual stimuli, from simple lines [10,11] to complex patterns such
as faces [12,13]. It is believed that sustained activity of neurons
during adaptation causes a shift in their subsequent response level,
leading to increased sensitivity to opposite (or complementary)
stimulus attributes [14]. The method of selective adaptation is
often referred to as the psychologist’s microelectrode because it allows
researchers to make inferences on the activity of neurons engaged
in the processing of adapting stimuli [14].
The extant physiological evidence that similar neural structures
are involved in perception and imagery leads to the hypothesis that
perceived and imagined stimuli should produce similar behavioral
results in a selective adaptation study. Despite this expectation, the
results from several prior experiments have been inconsistent,
reflecting the difficulty associated with using imagined visual stimuli
in experimental settings [15–20]. Some of these studies only
examined aftereffects induced by imagined stimuli with simple
visual attributes, such as color and orientation, which are believed to
activate early areas in the visual processing stream [21]. It is
experimentally challenging to control various visual attributes such
as precise hue orientation and size, of imagined stimuli [17,18].
Furthermore, low-level visual aftereffects are sensitive to a variety of
manipulations including changes in the size and position of adapting
stimuli [9]. While problems that are inherent in the use of simple
stimuli may partly explain some of the inconsistencies found in the
extant literature, a previous study which did not find significant
visual aftereffects induced by imagined complex stimuli such as faces
[20] warrants further considerations of other factors such as
participants’ familiarity of the experimental tasks and stimuli.
In this study, we sought to directly probe the neural networks
that underlie visual imagery and perception by inducing high-
level, face-identity aftereffects (FIA) through selective adaptation.
FIA occurs when adaptation to a particular face facilitates
identification of subsequent faces with opposite features (anti-
faces) while impairing identification of unrelated faces [12]. Unlike
aftereffects induced by low-level stimuli, the biological mechanisms
mediating FIA are invariant to changes in stimulus size, position,
and orientation [12,22].
For proper comparison of high-level aftereffects induced by
imagined and perceived stimuli, the task requirements in both
conditions should be identical. In order to ensure that the difficulty
of imagining complex stimuli would not interfere with task
performance, we used a fixed-order, within-subject design in
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imagined stimuli. In addition, we added a discrimination task to
ensure the identity information contained in perceived and
imagined faces was equivalent. We hypothesized that if perception
and imagery were indeed mediated by shared neural networks
then adaptation to real and imagined faces would produce a
similar bias in perception of subsequent faces.
Results
Data were averaged over 8 participants whose baseline
identification accuracy of test faces with 45% identity strength
exceeded 75%. A logistic function 1/(1+exp(2(x2c)/a)) was fitted
to the data, in which ‘a’ and ‘c’ are free parameters that determine
the slope and midpoint of the psychometric function.
Aftereffect tasks
At the end of the imagined-stimulus condition, all participants
reported to be able to imagine a corresponding face during the
adapting period. The imagined-stimulus condition was preceded by the
real-stimulus condition for all participants. Therefore, their familiarity
with the face stimuli was expected to be greater in the imagined-
stimulus condition. The baseline tasks in both conditions involved
identification of the morphed test faces without adaptation. The
increasedfamiliaritywith the stimuliintheimagined-stimulus condition
was reflected by the significantly increased performance on the
baseline task compared to that of the real-stimulus condition
[Greenhouse-Geisser correction for sphericity, F (1,7)=8.313,
P,0.05]. Due to the difference in the baseline performance between
the real- and imagined-stimulus conditions, the differential effects of
adaptation to matching (adapting face is the anti-face of the test face)
and non-matching (adapting and test faces do not have opposite
features) faces were analyzed for each stimulus condition.
In the real-stimulus condition, there was a significant increase in
identification performance after adaptation to ‘‘matching’’ faces
compared with the baseline condition. In contrast, identification
performance after adaptation to ‘‘non-matching’’ faces was
diminished compared to baseline (Fig. 1). The fractions of trials
in which participants correctly identified the test face in matching
and non-matching trials were compared to the baseline perfor-
mance. The respective differences in identification performance
between the trial types (matching and non-matching) and baseline
were subjected to a repeated-measure two-way analysis of variance
(ANOVA) with trial type and identity strength as factors. The
main effect of trial type [F (1,7)=61.536, P,0.001], and
interaction effect [F (2.832,19.824)=11.364, P,0.001] were
significant. The main effect of identity strength was marginally
significant [F (4.467,31.266)=3.651 P,0.05].
The imagined-stimulus condition produced a similar pattern of
results to the real-stimulus condition (Fig. 2). An ANOVA revealed a
significant main effect of trial type [F (1,7)=28.613, P,0.01] and
interaction effect [F (3.981,27.864)=4.051, P,0.001]. The main
effect of identity strength was not significant [F=(3.607,
25.251)=1.397, P.0.05].
Discrimination Task
The proportion of trials in which participants perceived the
second face (Face 2) differently from the anti-face (Face 1) on the
discrimination task was plotted against the difference in the
identity strengths of the two faces (Fig. 3). The anti-face was either
perceived or imagined. The data was fitted to a logistic function in
order to extrapolate difference thresholds (75% different responses)
for identifying visual and imagined faces. The difference thresholds
were identical at 13%.
Discussion
We have used selective adaptation methods designed to
induce face-identity aftereffects (FIA) to test psychophysically
whether face perception and imagery are processed by shared
neuronal ensembles. We found that adaptation to physically
presented matching anti-face images enhanced the recognition
of test faces, whereas adaptation to anti-face images that were
not matched to the test face resulted in reduced recognition
performance compared to baseline. These effects can be seen
from the corresponding shifts of the data points in Figure 1.
Adaptation to imagined matching and non-matching anti-faces
produced similar results—i.e., a significant increase in identi-
fication of test faces after adaptation to imagined ‘matching’
anti-faces and reduced identification performance relative to
baseline after adaptation to non-matching imagined anti-faces
(Fig. 2).
We also measured the respective difference thresholds for
identity strength in a discrimination task to investigate this
possibility and examine potential differences between the proper-
ties of real and mental images of learned faces. If imagined faces
indeed had wider identity boundaries than real images of those
same faces, this should be reflected in larger difference thresholds
for imaged faces. However, we found that difference thresholds for
real and imagined faces were the same, thus showing that the
identity represented in the imagined-stimulus condition was similar to
that contained in the real-stimulus condition.
Compared to the condition in which adapting stimuli were
physically presented, the magnitude of shift from the correspond-
ing baseline was much smaller when participants were asked to
imagine the adapting stimuli (Figs. 1a & 2a). The apparent
reduction of the aftereffect following adaptation to imagined
stimuli could be explained by the difficulty in visualizing a complex
image in a sustained, coherent manner. This may have lead to
diminished activation of neuronal ensembles that otherwise show
greater response to visual stimuli. The decreased activation of
these neurons may have produced a smaller net adaptation leading
to a smaller aftereffect.
We used a fixed-order, within-subject design to achieve
participants’ maximum familiarity with the experimental task
and stimuli during adaptation to imagined stimuli. It is possible
that the order in which the stimulus conditions were presented
could have influenced participants’ performance. Indeed, the
increased familiarity with the face stimuli during the imagined-
stimulus condition could have contributed to the reduced
magnitude of aftereffect, as the baseline performance during the
imagined-stimulus condition was significantly increased. However,
despite the increased familiarity with the face stimuli, adaptation
to non-matching imagined faces still reduced recognition perfor-
mance, suggesting that the adaptation effect of non-matching
imagined faces was comparable to that of real faces.
It is interesting to note that a similar study conducted by Moradi
et al. [20] failed to report a significant high-level aftereffect
induced by imagined faces. Due to the top-down nature of
imagery, it is absolutely necessary to minimize possible cognitive
and perceptual interferences during adaptation to imagined
stimuli. In our task, the presentation of the name of an adapting
face was brief, merely serving as cue for participants to imagine the
corresponding face. Consequently, no visual stimulus was
presented during adaptation. On the other hand, the name of
an adapting face continued to be shown during adaptation in the
study by Moradi et al. It is possible that continuous visual input
during adaptation could have interfered with imagery, resulting in
non-significant aftereffects.
FIA Induced by Imagery
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 May 2008 | Volume 3 | Issue 5 | e2195Figure 1. Sensitivity to face identity in real-stimulus conditions. The logistic function 1/(1+exp(2(x2c)/a)) was fitted to the data, in which ‘a’
and ‘c’ are free parameters that determine the midpoint and the slope of the psychometric function. The fraction of trials in which participants
correctly identified the test face is plotted in relation to the identity percentage contained in test faces. Data from baseline with no adaptation
(squares), adaptation to matching anti-face (triangles), and adaptation to non-matching anti-face (circles) are shown. The recognition threshold for
each condition was taken to be the inflection point of the corresponding curve and shown accordingly. (a) Average of all participants. Standard errors
are shown. (b and c) Individual data from two participants.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002195.g001
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adaptation to an imagined stimulus is reinforced by a neuroim-
aging study that compared fusiform face area (FFA) and
parahippocampal place area (PPA) activation during viewing or
imagery of faces and places [7]. This study showed that both
perception and imagery of faces selectively activated portions of
FFA, whereas viewing and imagery of places produced greater
activation in PPA. Interestingly, within a region responding more
Figure 2. Results from imagined-stimulus conditions. (a) average of all participants, with corresponding threshold for each condition. Standard
error of mean (SEM) are shown. (b & c) Data from two individual participants.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002195.g002
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[7] also reported stronger levels of activation for real compared to
imagined stimuli of that category. This finding is consistent with
our finding of a larger magnitude of FIA for real as compared to
imagined faces.
We have shown that adaptation to a visually presented anti-face
and to an imagined anti-face produces similar perceptual
aftereffects. The occurrence of such a high-level visual aftereffect
from a purely mental image reveals that a close neural interaction
exists between visual perception and imagery. The processing of
complex visual stimuli such as faces is believed to be specialized in
the later stages of the occipito-temporal visual processing stream
[23,24]. Accordingly, a recent neuroimaging study investigating
the neural activity underlying FIA reported that areas in the
anterior temporal lobe are involved in the mediation of the effect
[25]. Given the similarity in the shift of perception following
adaptation to imagined and real faces, these areas are likely to be
involved in producing FIA induced by imagined faces.
Representations of a familiar face not only contain information
about its visual attributes, but also semantic information regarding
its identity. It appears that the two types of information are closely
linked together. Support for this idea comes from a single-neuron
study that reported neurons in the human medial temporal cortex
that responded to both the presentation of a familiar face as well as
the proper name associated with the face [26]. Since our aftereffect
tasks involved perception and identification of familiar faces, some
aspects memory processes may have contributed to our results. It is
likely that both identity and visual information are activated
during adaptation to perceived and imagined familiar faces.
Our results are consistent with neuroimaging studies that have
shown selective activation of stimulus-specific brain regions in
extrastriate cortex following exposure to both real and imagined
stimuli. Similar activity following presentations of real and
imagined stimuli have been found in face- [5,7], object- [6] and
place-selective [7] regions. However, our evidence supporting the
commonality between neural structures underlying perception and
imagery appears to be in conflict with previous reports of patients
with dissociable deficits [1,2,27]. These patients showed severely
impaired perception but more intact imagery of complex objects.
It is possible, however, that intact imagery of these patients was
Figure 3. Difference thresholds for real (triangles) and imagined (squares) faces. The fraction of trials in which participants perceived the
test face to be different from the previously learned face is plotted in relation to identity difference between the anti- and test faces. Difference
thresholds (75% different responses) for the two psychometric functions for visual and imagined faces were identical.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002195.g003
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before the lesion. In that case, imagery tasks are likely to measure
the patient’s ability to remember, rather than to imagine what was
just perceived. Although these studies provide interesting insight
into the overall brain networks supporting perception and
imagery, the dissociable deficits found in patients do not
necessarily provide support for separate neural structures mediat-
ing these two experiences.
Our finding of equivalent identity boundaries for visual and
mental images suggests that face imagery activates robust and
accurate face representations that are similar to those produced by
visual stimulation. We propose that the similarity in identity
contained in imagined and real faces is produced by activation of
shared neural networks that code for these representations.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Ten undergraduate students from McGill University participated
in the study (2 males, mean age of 19.1 years). Participants were
naı ¨ve to the purpose of the experiment. All had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision. The study was reviewed and approved by an
institutional ethics board for human psychophysical studies. Written
consent was acquired from each participant prior to the experimen-
tal session. Data from two participants whose baseline identification
accuracy of test faces with 45% identity strength task did not exceed
75% during the aftereffect tasks were removed from analysis.
Apparatus and stimuli
All stimuli were presented on an LG flat-screen monitor with
10246768 resolution and 85 Hz refresh rate. The stimuli were
centrally presented on a uniform black background. The
presentation sequence was programmed in MATLAB software
using the Psychophysics Toolbox extensions [28]. A chinrest was
used to stabilize head position at a distance of 57 cm from the
monitor surface. All experiments were carried out in a dark testing
room. The size of stimuli did not exceed 7610.5 degrees.
Three face/anti-face pairs were taken from those used in the
previous study reporting FIA [12]. According to the face space
model, the anti-face of a face is located on the same identity axis but
on the other side of the mean on the computationally derived, multi-
dimensional face space [12,29]. Therefore, the facial features of the
face/anti-face pair are completely opposite to each other. The
identity strength of each face was manipulated by adjusting its
distance from the average face on the face space. Identity strength of
face stimuli ranged from 0 (the average face) to 45%. Due to the
computational processes through which anti-faces are generated, the
maximal identity strength of an anti-face was 45%.
Procedures
The experiment was divided into real- and imagined-stimulus
conditions. Both conditions began with a training session in which
participants were familiarized with the face stimuli. The identity
strength of the faces was 45%. Each face appeared for five seconds
on the monitor along with its fictional name (6 faces in total). The
serial presentation of the faces was repeated seven times and the
order of presentation was randomized. The participants’ familiar-
ity with the faces was probed with a verbal identification task in
which each face was presented without its name. The presentation
of the faces and identification task were repeated until 100%
accuracy on the identification task was achieved.
In order to maximize the participants’ familiarity with the anti-
faces during the imagined-stimulus condition, all participants complet-
edthereal-stimulusconditionbeforeproceedingtotheimagined-stimulus
condition. In the imagined-stimulus condition, a discrimination task
(described below) was added and was administered before the
aftereffect task. In both real- and imagined-stimulus conditions, the
baseline task, in which participants were required to identify test
faces without adaptation, was completed after the aftereffect task.
Figure 4. Trial sequence in the aftereffect tasks during the real- and imagined-stimulus conditions. A five-second presentation of the
adapting stimulus was followed by a brief presentation of a test face. After adaptation, observers were asked to identity the test face among three
shown faces.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002195.g004
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In each trial of the aftereffect task, a five-second presentation of
the adapting face was followed by a brief presentation (400 ms) of
a morphed test face (Fig. 4). There was no ISI between the
adapting and test images. The adapting face was one of the three
anti-faces. The identity strength of a test face used in the aftereffect
task ranged from 0 to 45%. The identity strength of anti-faces was
45%. In the real-stimulus condition, the adaptor was a true face
image, whereas in the imagined-stimulus condition a name served as
a cue prompting participants to vividly visualize the corresponding
face with their eyes open. After adaptation, observers were asked
to identify the test face among three shown face names and
indicate their answers by pressing the appropriate button on the
keyboard. Each adapting anti-face was shown 100 times during
the aftereffect task, for the total of 300 trials in each condition.
Theaftereffecttaskswerecomposedof‘‘matching’’trials,inwhich
the features of adapting and test stimuli were opposite to each other
(face/anti-face pair) and ‘‘non-matching’’ trials, in which the two
face stimuli were not perceptually related. An equal number (150) of
matching and non-matching trials was randomly interleaved. To
reduce a possible learning effect, we administered a baseline task
after the respective aftereffect tasks. The baseline task required
participants to identify test faces without adaptation. The test faces,
as well as the number of trials presented during the baseline task,
were identical to those shown during the aftereffect task.
Discrimination task
To assess possible differences in the degree of face identity
contained in real and imagined stimuli, we sought to measure the
difference threshold for identities in real and imagined faces in a
discrimination task (Fig. 5). In this task, participants were
instructed to compare either the real or the mental images of
the anti-faces (Face 1) with subsequent real faces (Face 2).
Participants indicated whether the two face stimuli (Faces 1 & 2)
belong to the same person with a key press. Face 2 matched the
identity of Face 1 (i.e., both faces can be found on the same
identity trajectory on the face-space), but the identity strengths of
Face 2 stimuli were less than those of the Face 1 stimuli: The
identity strengths of Face 1 stimuli were 45% whereas the identity
strengths of Face 2 stimuli varied from 5 to 40%. Each Face 2
stimulus appeared 5 times with each of the real and imagined Face
1 stimuli. Participants completed 180 trials in total.
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